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Abstract
The electricity distribution grid was not designed to
cope with load dynamics imposed by high penetra-
tion of electric vehicles, neither to deal with the in-
creasing deployment of distributed Renewable En-
ergy Sources. Distribution System Operators (DSO)
will increasingly rely on flexible Distributed En-
ergy Resources (flexible loads, controllable genera-
tion and storage) to keep the grid stable and to
ensure quality of supply. In order to properly in-
tegrate demand-side flexibility, DSOs need new en-
ergy management architectures, capable of fostering
collaboration with wholesale market actors and pro-
sumers. We propose the creation of Virtual Distri-
bution Grids (VDG) over a common physical infras-
tructure, to cope with heterogeneity of resources and
actors, and with the increasing complexity of distri-
bution grid management and related resources alloca-
tion problems. Focusing on residential VDG, we pro-
pose an agent-based hierarchical architecture for pro-
viding Demand-Side Management services through
a market-based approach, where households trans-
act their surplus/lack of energy and their flexibil-
ity with neighbours, aggregators, utilities and DSOs.
For implementing the overall solution, we consider
fine-grained control of smart homes based on Inter-
net of Things technology. Homes seamlessly trans-
act self-enforcing smart contracts over a blockchain-
based generic platform. Finally, we extend the ar-
chitecture to solve existing problems on smart home
control, beyond energy management.
1 Introduction
The increasing deployment of distributed renewable
energy sources (RES), like residential solar panels at-
tached to the distribution grid1, and the growth in
adoption of electric vehicles (EV) are posing severe
challenges to Distribution System Operators (DSO),
e.g.: in terms of quality of supply, congestion, voltage
variations and on the protection system. In order to
cope with these challenges DSOs will increasingly rely
on flexible2 Distributed Energy Resources (DER),
such as flexible loads, controllable generation, or stor-
age resources, to keep the grid stable and to ensure
quality of supply. Nevertheless, existing distribution
grid energy mangament mechanisms are not adapted
for such evolutions. In order to properly integrate
demand side flexibility distribution grids need new
energy management architectures, capable of foster-
ing coordination and collaboration among wholesale
market actors, DSOs and prosumers3.
We consider an end to end architecture that, when-
ever necessary and convenient for players, can in-
tegrate the control of edge devices including cus-
tomer appliances. The Internet of Things (IoT)
1The electricity grid is structured hierarchically into trans-
mission grid level carrying electricity at high voltages across
long distances and distribution grids that deliver medium/low
voltage electricity in shorter distances.
2Flexibility, in this context, can be defined as the capability
to adapt demand and/or injection flows of electricity to the
grid by adapting consumption patterns, controlling generation
output or storing energy.
3Prosumers represent the evolution of passive consumer role
into a pro-active participation on grid activities.
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paradigm promises to enable connected devices to
identify themselves, describe their capabilities, dis-
cover each other, and self-organize in order to pro-
vide innovative services. In particular, in the context
of Smart homes and Smart grids, it will enable cus-
tomers to seamlessly play a more active role, facili-
tating providing flexibility to the grid.
Such flexibility is already being exploited at whole-
sale electricity markets through recently adopted
market mechanisms and new roles. Flexibility is ag-
gregated into Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) by Ag-
gregators and offered in substitution of expensive
and polluting power plants at the energy markets.
Balancing Responsable Entities (BRE)(such as Utili-
ties) can also use demand side flexibility and transact
blocks of energy among them to optimize their partic-
ipation on the market. Transmission System Opera-
tors (TSO) also leverage flexibility for balancing the
grid in real time through the Balancing Mechanism
(or tertiary reserve).
While wholesale markets and TSOs have adapted
to leverage demand side flexibility, DSOs continue
reinforcing and extending the infrastructure as the
main lever to cope with distribution grid challenges,
which is currently hindering RES deployment pace.
The use of flexible DER will enable to reduce/defer
infrastructure investments and to gain fine grained
control over infrastructure and services. But, at
present, storage resources and Building Energy Man-
agement Systems follow a stand-lone approach, focus-
ing on auto-consumption and local energy efficiency,
and therefore may worsen the negative impacts on the
distribution grid because of the lack of coordination
among actors.
The objective of this work is twofold. First, to
provide the architecture building blocks for new dis-
tribution grid Energy Management Systems (EMS),
capable of fostering such coordination among actors.
The architecture should allow DSOs to better con-
trol the power balance and quality of supply of the
distribution grid. In particular, locally balancing
distributed RES production with demand flexibil-
ity has the potential to alleviate congestion, reduce
losses and consequently augment variable RES host-
ing capacity without further infrastructure reinforce-
ments/extensions. Second, providing means to im-
plement the novel building blocks proposed in this
architecture. In particular, such implementation re-
quires to solve issues at the household level of the
architecture, related to conflicting transactions that
may hinder the control of flexible DER. Such con-
flicts arrive when controllers from different domains
(energy, health, security, comfort) share the same en-
vironmental scope or control simultaneously the same
edge devices.
The paper first addresses the main design objec-
tives and requirements of new generation distribution
grids’ EMS and analyzes current approaches for co-
ordinating the allocation of flexible DER: Microgrids
and VPPs. Then we propose the concept of Virtual-
ized Distribution Grid (VDG) as a new paradigm fa-
cilitating distribution grid management. We focus on
a residential VDG. We propose a hierarchical agent-
based architecture capable of providing Demand Side
Management (DSM) services through market-based
resource allocation mechanisms. We envision the dis-
tributed implementation of several markets to enable
households to transact their surplus or lack of en-
ergy and the demand flexibility budget with neigh-
bours, utilities, aggregators and DSOs. The infras-
tructure that enables market exchanges is based on
blockchain technology and self-enforcing smart con-
tracts4. Finally, we address the problem of conflicts
among controller agents at the household level. The
solution relies on an extension of the blockchain-
based platform, which enables the implementation
of Event-Condition-Action (ECA) control schemes
on-premises[1], improving security and privacy com-
pared with cloud-based ECA implementations.
2 Distribution grid Energy
Management System
2.1 Objectives of a distribution grid
EMS
The main goal of a distribution grid EMS is to enforce
efficiency, reliability and quality of energy supply, for
which leveraging DER flexibility through DSM mech-
4http://szabo.best.vwh.net/
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anisms will be a main technological enabler. Thus,
a distribution grid EMS architecture needs to enable
the following functionalities:
Local energy balancing Leverage coordination of
DER to balance local production at the distribution
level (neighbourhood/village). This has the poten-
tial to alleviate congestion, reduce losses and conse-
quently augment variable RES hosting capacity.
DSO “Reserves” Enable DSO to influence flex-
ible DER behaviour for collaborating with voltage
control and congestion management.
Wholesale Market participation Maintain col-
laboration with global objectives for grid balancing,
through actors participating in the wholesale market,
such as suppliers and aggregators.
Value to customers The prosumer side of the par-
ticipation on all the previous mechanisms needs to be
taken into account and the allocation of DER to such
mechanisms needs to be optimized for customer goals
and policies; e.g.: minimizing impact on privacy, ease
of life and comfort.
2.2 Requirements for a distribution
grid EMS
The requirements for a distribution grid energy man-
agement architecture are the following:
• Reliability/Fault Tolerance - In order to leverage
DER flexibility, any solution that tends to dis-
tribute the intelligence will need to maintain sys-
tem reliability and fault tolerance. In this con-
text, the EMS architecture must continue work-
ing under communication errors, or under pres-
ence of node failures or byzantine nodes.
• Flexible and Extensible - Flexible and extensible
implies Plug and Play capabilities, which enable
seamless integration over time [2], i.e.: handle
continual arrival and departures of appliances,
resources and control agents at different levels of
the architecture.
• Scalability - There are a multitude of DERs,
spawned over distant geographic areas, owned
by different actors. Various market players,
each one with its own objectives, are interested
on leveraging those resources at different time
scales. The EMS architecture needs to cope with
the scalability issues in terms of time, scope and
heterogeneity of resources and involved actors.
• Trustworthiness - The actors in charge of the
EMS or the energy management mechanisms
and their implementation need to be trusted:
This implies Transparency, Security and Pri-
vacy on the transactions among participating
actors. With respect to transparency, visibility
over DER at the distribution level is becoming
increasingly important to avoid system imbal-
ances.
• Low Implementation and Maintenance Cost -
Business models are not yet clear, as pricing
schemes and flexibility value characterization are
still being studied, so the costs imposed by the
energy management mechanism must be mini-
mized.
• Re-usability of Infrastructure and platforms
across distribution grids (Energy, Water, Gas,
Heat). Re-usability of infrastructure and tech-
nologies should be aimed whenever possible, as
a mater of costs but also due to interoperabil-
ity, cross resource services (Combined Heat and
Power management), critical mass of experts,
etc.
• Independent evolution of control strategies. The
architecture should enable the independent evo-
lution of control strategies at different levels
(Household, Distribution Grid, System Level),
to cope with the fast progress of technologies and
control mechanisms.
• Efficiency and equity. In order to maximize
social welfare, energy management mechanisms
should maximize the value extracted from flex-
ible resources and provide a fair distribution
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across participants, according to the service def-
initions. Furthermore, economic efficiency is re-
quired to incentive actors participation.
2.3 Current approaches for DER
management
The two main approaches to manage flexible DER,
both in literature and in practice, have been Micro-
grids and Virtual Power Plants (VPPs). Microgrids
are defined as an entire partition of the physical in-
frastructure, with a Point of Common Coupling as
unique interface with the hosting grid. This enables
the possibility of isolation, but requires a unique actor
to manage electricity flows exchanged with the host-
ing grid and economic transactions into the wholesale
market (Figure 1). For this reason, Microgrids are a
good model for a university campus or small com-
munities. However, in the general case, there would
be several actors (suppliers, aggregators, etc.) par-
ticipating individually on wholesale markets by ag-
gregating DER from the distribution grid. Thus, if
we were to consider the Microgrid approach as the
canonical method for distribution grid energy man-
agement, we would need to redefine the roles of DSO,
aggregators and current BRE, and to adapt wholesale
market rules accordingly.
On the other hand, VPPs are focused on wholesale
market participation as a replacement of conventional
power plants, and for this they aggregate DER flex-
ibility from accross several distribution grids. VPPs
are implemented through contracts with flexibility
DER owners, obtaining the exclusive control of phys-
ical devices. In consequence, the corresponding DER
are not available, neither visible to third parties. This
lack of visibility may have negative impacts in grid
balancing if there is no coordination among actors.
VPPs play a major role in the participation of DER
in wholesale markets but they do not have a clear
role at the distribution level and may not take into
account distribution grid constraints. Other papers
have considered coordination among VPPs and DSO:
[3] assumes that “a sort of local market is established”
in order to be able to coordinate the concurrent oper-
ation of DSO and VPP through appropriate economic
signals. While the Fenix project defines a Technical
Figure 1: Microgrid and VPP approaches to DER
management
VPP which clusters RES from the same geographi-
cal area and would need tight coordination with the
DSO [4]. To the extent of our knowledge, current lit-
erature about VPP has not addressed a general way
of coordinating DER participation on wholesale mar-
kets with distribution grid needs.
3 Introducing the Virtualized
Distribution Grid concept
Current approaches fail to take into account the coor-
dination at the distribution grid level across multiple
actors as they focus on the aggregation of resources
for participating on the wholesale market. Thus, we
propose a new architecture for distribution grid en-
ergy management, with the goal of coordinating the
usage of flexible energy resources among different ac-
tors. The approach is compatible with microgrids
and VPPs, as it does not targets wholesale mar-
ket participation, but requires Microgrids and VPPs
to negotiate the access to flexible DER through the
corresponding resource allocation mechanism. Any
other future system aimed to leverage flexible DER
in wholesale markets would need to interact with such
coordination mechanisms. As a consequence of aim-
ing neutral resource allocation mechanisms, the dis-
tribution grid can be transparently managed, offering
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Figure 2: Virtual Distribution Grids approach to
DER management
visibility for all relevant grid actors.
The resource allocation mechanisms need to cope
with several types of flexible resources, with a wide
scope of characteristics. Such resources are owned
by various types of self-interested actors (residential,
commercial and industrial prosumers, EV charging
stations, energy service providers, aggregators, etc.),
whose objectives are not necessarily aligned with dis-
tribution grid needs. To cope with the complex-
ity of such mechanisms, we propose the creation of
VDGs in charge of the energy management of subsets
of resources by type and corresponding actors, over
common distribution grid infrastructure. Each VDG
will require different architectural building blocks and
specific management policies and algorithms, e.g.:
we could envisage a VDG for management of DER
from residential prosumers in a neighbourhood and
another for managing electric vehicle charging on a
feeder (Figure 2).
This is similar to the approach used on cloud envi-
ronments to optimize the allocation of physical re-
sources (processing power, storage or bandwidth),
where a native hypervisor enables the creation of var-
ious virtual machines over a shared physical infras-
tructure. Every virtual machine needs an Operat-
ing System (OS) to access logical resources through
the corresponding drivers. Additionally each OS
will have algorithms to efficiently allocate available
virtual resources to applications. An OS provides
an execution environment to application programs,
abstracting the low level complexity of resources
from users and application developers (through user-
spaces and Software Development Kits respectively).
Back to the energy management problem, the role
of the DSO is analogous to the one of an hypervisor,
in charge of keeping a coherent global behaviour be-
tween infrastructure management and energy man-
agement. DSOs would monitor physical resources
and impose constraints to the each VDG5 resource
allocation process or incentive behaviour of actors
through a reserve mechanism. We can imagine that
some VDGs would have more priority than others
in the context of congested distribution lines, and by
prioritizing, DSOs could even offer differentiated grid
connection services.
The notion of OS on a VDG would be that of
an EMS architecture6 providing visibility and control
over DER, by enabling its allocation to the different
possible usages, in a similar way an OS allocates pro-
cessing power to applications on a virtual machine.
The main “applications” that will compete for DER
should enable power balancing inside the VDG, par-
ticipation in existing wholesale market mechanisms,
and providing services to the DSO for voltage and
congestion management. Actors foreseeing those uses
will probably be competing for flexible resources in
the same time-slots where the grid needs them more
and flexibility has more commercial value. The EMS
architecture needs to provide a cost-effective, trans-
parent and secure coordination mechanism to allo-
cate flexible resources to maximize social welfare; i.e.:
to provide an equitable (e.g.: max-min fairness) and
efficient (e.g.: Pareto efficient) allocation. In the fol-
lowing we will focus on the EMS of a particular type
of VDG rather than on the role of DSO as an orches-
trator of real and virtual resources. We will analyse
general aspects of the design of an architecture ca-
pable of providing such an allocation of distributed
resources.
5Note that there is no complete isolation among VDGs due
to the correlation created by voltage variations. We are cur-
rently analysing mechanisms for coping with such issues.
6Note that the implementation of the EMS functions will
run over an OS, but that is not what we are discussing here.
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4 Design of a Residential VDG
In this work we focus on the EMS of residential
VDGs, i.e: on the management of flexible DER from
residential prosumers in a neighbourhood/feeder. In
particular, we are interested on locally balancing
distributed renewable energy production by leverag-
ing IoT technologies to communicate, monitor and
control flexible residential DER. For the design of
the residential VDG energy management architecture
we will consider special attention to interoperabil-
ity among architecture implementations, distribution
of intelligence, security and privacy requirements, as
these aspects play a major role on the viability of an
IoT-based architecture.
4.1 Hierarchical Architecture
Centralized approaches for distribution energy man-
agement rely on a unique entity that must gather
data, perform calculations and determine set points
for every controlled resources. A centralized ap-
proach provides optimality at the expense of exten-
sive communication and computing resources and
lack of flexibility and adaptability. Furthermore, a
central fully informed entity may not be available due
to natural information asymmetries and selfish par-
ticipants, i.e.: DER have different owners and deci-
sions are made locally to optimize owner’s objectives
[5]. Additionally, certain information is only available
locally due to privacy concerns, such as presence in-
formation. Thus, it is hard for centralized control to
handle customer policies based on context awareness,
such as comfort or auto-consumption policies.
On the other hand, fully decentralized approaches
that take decisions using local information without
coordination can lead to synchronization and oscil-
lation of the overall response. In particular, there
exist already plenty of technologies enabling a more
efficient usage of electricity and promoting auto-
consumption for households that count on local PV
production and/or storage facilities. These systems
may not take the needs of the grid into account and
affect the way utilities (and other BRE) balance cus-
tomer demand and market supply, as their statisti-
cal models for load forecasting would not be valid
any longer. Therefore, unless managed appropriately,
such systems may create stronger and recurrent im-
balances on the grid.
Even if the geographical extent of a residential
VDG is not large, we still have a considerable num-
ber of controllable resources with stringent perfor-
mance requirements, in terms of high-speed commu-
nication and computation of actions/set points for
every unit[2]. A hierarchical approach would drasti-
cally reduce such requirements for data gathering and
processing, and would enable the independent evolu-
tion of control strategies and technologies by defining
clear interfaces among levels (like through Applica-
tion Programming Interfaces). Thus, we propose a
mix of control strategies composing a hierarchy of
three levels: the control inside each household, the
allocation of prosumer resources at the distribution
grid level and the Transport level that controls the
overall grid balance.
We will focus on the two lower levels, as wholesale
market and TSO control mechanisms, in spite of their
continuous evolution, are more mature and reliable
than the rest of control levels. Furthermore, we want
to avoid requiring changes from the higher level other
than small changes for the actors participating in the
market, i.e.: on the way suppliers and aggregators
gain access to flexible DER.
4.2 Household Control level
Households represent the base of the hierarchical ar-
chitecture for coordinating the allocation of DER re-
sources to the different DR mechanisms depending on
customer policies and economic incentives. In partic-
ular, security and privacy policies would lead to keep
sensible data under the control of the customer to
gain trust and acceptance. In order to enable such
an empowerment, the distribution of data and the
intelligence required for its treatment need to be de-
signed accordingly. Considering a separate level for
the energy management of a household enables such
a distributed intelligence approach.
Each household will have an energy management
function (HEMS) providing coordination among flex-
ible loads, storage, local production and energy con-
sumed from the global grid or from the VDG. Each
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HEMS will have its own knowledge and individual
goals, and the capability to transact resources with
the upper levels through a trading agent. The trading
agent will abstract heterogeneity of household con-
trol implementations from the distribution grid level,
i.e.: one agent representing the global goals of the
smart home regardless of the coordination and con-
trol mechanism implemented inside each household.
4.3 Distribution Grid Control level
In order to optimize the scheduling and dispatch
of DER, coordination among households, DSO and
other grid actors is mandatory. We envision the im-
plementation of market-based mechanisms, enabling
coordination and collaboration among trading agents
representing households, DSO and other grid actors
through the exchange of energy transactions (Figure
3). Agents will transact energy resources with each
other in order to meet household economic and com-
fort goals, while collaborating with local and global
grid infrastructure operation issues7. Markets have
proven to be a suitable mechanism for resource allo-
cation and control of autonomous selfish parties, and
have already been tested for Distribution Grid En-
ergy Management in the US, following the Transac-
tive Energy approach [6], and in Europe under several
demostrator projects generally involving microgrids
[7][8][9].
DSOs will implement agents representing the in-
frastructure needs from each VDG, for maintain-
ing power quality and security constraints. This
agent will be fed by the global distribution man-
agement system with day ahead operational require-
ments and by Supervisory Control And Data Acqui-
sition (SCADA) system with information about grid
conditions and reliability requirements for real time
distribution automation.
BREs and other actors participating wholesale
markets will be represented by agents on every VDG
of the low voltage distribution level. This will enable
those entities to gain feedback on the behaviour of
the households comprised on their balancing domain
7We assume the necessary regulation is in place to allow
households to establish transactions among them for the ex-
change of energy.
Figure 3: Hierarchical architecture for distribution
grid energy management
and to better manage the aggregation of several sec-
tors to provide services and to optimize their demand
portfolio on the wholesale markets.
All previous processes need to take into account
the economic scheduling and dispatch of DER re-
sources in order to encourage participation on the
EMS. Though business models are out of the scope
of this work, we consider current economic signals
are not favourable in most European countries for
exploiting DER flexibility, but we assume they will
evolve towards a more encouraging context.
4.4 Wholesale Market-adapted
Timescales
Until now we have addressed the architecture hier-
archy in terms of space or control areas and now we
will consider the timescales in which energy resources
would need to be allocated. We will consider three
time scales, day ahead, intraday and real time, in
order to adapt the allocation of flexible capabilities
to the market structure and to ease the interaction
among levels.
4.4.1 Day-ahead process
On the day ahead process, each HEMS will esti-
mate the surplus or lack of energy for every hour
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of the next day, based on consumption and produc-
tion forecasts. Then, the expected imbalance can be
eliminated/minimized by scheduling controllable ap-
pliances or can be traded in the VDG market with
other households or with actors participating on the
wholesale market. The HEMS will decide the volume
of electricity to be traded on the market with the cor-
responding price cap, by optimizing the scheduling of
controllable appliances taking into account economic
incentives (price of electricity supply, aggregator of-
fers, feed-in tariffs, etc.) and customer policies (e.g.:
comfort constraints).
The trading agent representing each household will
send the corresponding bids and asks to the VDG
market, which will match the orders determining
the volume and price of equilibrium for each hour
of the day. This process should finish earlier than
the Day-ahead wholesale market, as the energy that
was not balanced on the local market needs to be
provided/absorbed through the wholesale markets or
Over The Counter agreements, and the flexibility re-
sources that were not traded on the local market re-
main available to the wholesale mechanisms.
4.4.2 Intraday process
The intraday process in each household will
detect variations from the expected day-ahead
load/production schedule and to allocate those gaps
to the remaining local flexibility budget or to intraday
VDG market mechanism. The VDG intraday market
mechanism works in a similar way to the wholesale
mechanism, where BREs can aggregate traded vol-
umes and offer them to the balancing mechanism,
the intraday energy market, or can exchange blocks
with another balance responsible party in order to
avoid paying penalties to the TSO. Thanks to this
mechanism DSOs will have the capability to avoid
congestion, reduce losses or control voltage by influ-
encing demand-side energy behaviors, e.g.: by build-
ing a distribution grid reserve.
4.4.3 Real-time process
In the real-time process, controllable loads need to
fulfill the transactions they applied for in day-ahead
and intraday, and the aggregators/BRE need eventu-
ally to execute balancing orders transmitted by the
TSO in response to accepted bids on the balancing
mechanism. In a similar way to previous processes,
we will try to eliminate imbalances or to trade them
into the market, but in this case the imbalance is
measured with respect to an objective that depends
on the mechanism to which resources were allocated.
For example, if resources were allocated to an aggre-
gator participating to the adjustment reserves, the
objective will be to reduce/augment the energy con-
sumed with respect to the last half an hour; while if
resources were allocated to a distribution system re-
serve the objective may be to follow a curve provided
by the DSO. The real time mechanism is not to be
confused with Primary Control, which is autonomous
frequency and voltage control, and the fastest re-
sponse to stabilize the grid under system dynam-
ics. In this work we assume the physical resources
attributed to the VDG are grid-connected and thus
Primary Control is assured at system level, i.e.: we
do not consider isolation of physical resources.
5 Control infrastructure and
market implementation
5.1 Distribution grid control level
We will describe the main ideas for the implemen-
tation of local balancing markets on the residential
VDG, which represent the base for the other mar-
kets/auctions that aggregators, suppliers and DSOs
can use to interact with flexible DER owners.
The implementation of such markets would need
a third party on the role of auctioneer, for keeping
an order book, matching orders at the end of the
round/period, i.e.: defining the price and the vol-
umes to be traded, and also for clearing and settle-
ment, through which assets (in this case money and
energy) are verified and the economic transactions
are executed. The rounds/periods will depend on
the market, as there will be several markets operating
simultaneously; for instance we will have day-ahead,
intra-day and real-time markets, where excess or lack
of energy can be balanced locally.
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For the local balancing market, we envisage the ex-
change of energy blocks among trading agents to be
carried out in a call market, through a Multi-unit
Double Auction (MDA) mechanism, where agents
submit a bid or ask for orders, which are respectively
the maximum, or minimum, price the agent is will-
ing to pay to buy, or to accept to sell, a certain vol-
ume of energy on certain time slot. From all possible
matching mechanisms encompassed under MDA[10],
we will choose the one presented on [11], which has
already been used for energy allocation markets[12]
and complies with certain interesting characteristics:
• Strategy-proof with respect to reservation price -
Means that each agent’s best strategy is to reveal
truthful information regardless of what the other
agents are doing, i.e.: no agent can benefit from
lying about its price, which could hinder social
welfare maximization.
• Weakly budget-balanced - All the payments be-
tween buyers and sellers sum to a positive value.
• Individually rational - The market encourages
participation by ensuring non-negative profits.
• Asymptotically efficient - The market becomes
more efficient with the increasing amount of par-
ticipants, maximizing total profit obtained by all
participants.
Economic transactions that impact the control of
physical assets need to be managed in a secure, re-
liable and transparent manner. A centralized entity
enforcing those requirements may imply transaction
fees that could make energy micro-transactions un-
feasible, due to infrastructure operation and mainte-
nance costs; e.g.: for avoiding a single point of fail-
ure or Denial of Service attacks, to improve security
and reliability, costly third party cloud computing
resources may be needed. Furthermore, such enti-
ties generally require security deposits (collateral) to
cope with counter-party risks, such as insolvency is-
sues, that may lead to high costs of entry and to an
increase in fees/taxes due to auditing costs.
The alternative to a centralized auctioneer would
be implementing market matching, clearing and set-
tlement rules into open standardized code to be ex-
ecuted by a network of distributed agents. Thus, we
would still be under an institutional price-setting[10]
mechanism but the institution could be implemented
as a distributed application. Next we will analyse
some of the challenges for building a distributed mar-
ket involving digital and physical assets and we will
present some of our implementation choices.
5.1.1 Transaction Verification
One of the main challenges of a digital market comes
from the interactions with the physical world, par-
ticularly in terms of verification of transaction en-
forcement, which can hardly be done in a distributed
fashion and generally requires a trusted entity. DSOs
could be in charge of verifying the enforcement of
transactions by measuring electricity injections and
extraction flows, which is one of the main roles they
currently play, they are trusted with and audited for.
Furthermore, in the future, such verification could
be done automatically as a service provided by smart
meters.
As most transactions are for the exchange of re-
sources on the future, they behave as options or for-
ward contracts, and verification of service delivery is
separated in time from transaction clearing[13]. As
we cannot tag electrons to identify where they go,
we cannot differentiate the injections and extractions
that were transacted on the local market from the
ones provided by the utility supplier. For instance,
we will assume that the energy transacted on the local
market has the preference/priority regarding verifica-
tion. For example, if a household equipped with a PV
sells its forecasted surplus of electricity in the local
market, and then it produces less, the supplier will
provide the energy to the consumer in the contract,
but the producer will have to pay the difference in
price. This way, agents are incentivized to have good
forecasts and to transact accordingly.
5.1.2 Blockchain-based transaction mecha-
nism
When two parties want to establish a digital trans-
action over a distributed network, they need to
claim ownership of the digital/physical assets in-
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volved and to ensure transactions are non-reversible,
particularly when digital transactions comprise non-
reversible physical services. Digital signatures to-
gether with some asset registry, provide a solution
to the problem of ownership and authorization for
spending assets, but do not solve the double-spending
problem. Double-spending is a fundamental prob-
lem of the cryptocurrency world, which occurrs when
an entity that earns certain amount of digital assets
transacts that same amount simultaneously to two
other entities, and if there is no distributed way for
determining which transaction arrived first, transac-
tions can be easily reverted in the absence of a cen-
tralize clearing entity.
Bitcoin provided the first distributed solution to
double spending problem by establishing a chain of
ownership and a mechanism for agreeing in a dis-
tributed fashion about transfers of ownership and va-
lidity of transactions. This mechanism is called the
blockchain, as it groups transactions into blocks and
chains them together using cryptographic technolo-
gies, building up the transitions into current state
of affairs. From those technologies, Proof of Work
(PoW) is the most important, as it makes it difficult
for a node to publish a new block of transactions by
tying the validity of a new block to the solution of
a complex mathematical puzzle. The solution to the
puzzle requires trial and error and difficulty is ad-
justed for blocks to be published periodically. This
makes it very hard and costly for an attacker to fork
the chain and introduce invalid transactions, as it
needs to have more than half of the hashing power
of the network to carry an effective attack. As this
mechanisms requires a lot of energy for maintaining
the agreement on the network, there exist alterna-
tives such as Proof of Stake (PoS), which are more
efficient and may have similar security guarantees.
Though, our focus is on the blockchain, because it can
be seen as a distributed, self-authenticating, time-
stamped store of data[14], which in addition allows
to execute code in a distributed and extremely reli-
able manner, and thus can be used for many things
other than cryptocurrencies.
Ethereum is the most relevant project generaliz-
ing the usage of blockchain technology by providing
the necessary tools for the implementation of Smart
contracts permanently stored on the blockchain. The
Smart contract concept in the context of blockchain
can be seen as a modular, repeatable script, which
can be used to build distributed autonomous appli-
cations. When a transaction is sent to a contract the
code is automatically executed and is able to use the
data which is sent with the transaction[14]. We plan
to use the Ethereum blockchain as a base for the im-
plementation and testing of our distributed energy
balancing market.
5.1.3 Blockchain-based distributed energy
market
We can translate the notion of double-spending,
which means that a resource cannot be used twice,
into the energy management case where the resource
would be an energy block or certain flexibility bud-
get, and cannot be owned by two entities at the same
time, i.e.: at the neighborhood scale, energy trans-
actions involving KWatts or NegaWatts should not
be duplicated. In the energy case, we could build a
chain of ownership on resources, that would be traded
in advance in a per time-slot fashion, in exchange of
some reward that would represent the utility of us-
ing such energy/flexibility, and that cannot either be
double-spent.
We envisage the implementation of an exchange
market for digital tokens which will represent the ex-
change of physical assets per digital currency. Money
will be represented by a token we will refer to as Bit-
coin, but could be any other digital currency. Phys-
ical assets, i.e.: energy blocks/flexibility budget, will
be represented by a token we will call ecoin, whose
economic value will be tethered to the verification of
the corresponding electricity flow. There should be a
distributed registry of ownership of ecoins for these
to be available for transactions on the markets, which
will enable to enforce security (authenticate partic-
ipants) and privacy (assign pseudonyms). Trading
agents must register availability of ecoins for each
time slot, as the clearing procedure will verify the
ecoins in order to validate transactions. Such reg-
istry can easily be implemented on the blockchain or
on a distributed database with similar properties.
Initially, ecoins on the ownership registry will not
10
have any economic value, but, using the fact that
digital tokens are not completely fungible, each ecoin
will acquire its value only once there is a proof of
flow (PoF) over the contracted flow of energy involv-
ing those ecoins, meaning an ecoin is minted each
time an energy exchange is physically verified8. Once
there is the PoF, meaning once the DSO verified the
enforcement of the contract and signed the trans-
action, the transaction is validated and the ecoins
can be exchanged by Bitcoins at the rate agreed on
the contract. The ecoins would represent a certifi-
cate of green energy consumption and can have many
applications, such as social comparison/competition
among electricity consumers for the energy efficiency
or CO2 emission reductions.
There will be one or several smart contracts imple-
menting each market, to which traders would need
to address their bids and ask in order to participate.
Those smart contracts would implement each aspect
of the market, including matching offers (through an
implementation of MDA), clearing (by verifying the
buyer has enough Bitcoin and the seller owns enough
ecoins), and settlement of transactions (registering on
the blockchain the exchange of Bitcoins and ecoins at
the rate specified by the matching mechanism).
In addition to the local balancing markets, the dis-
tributed nature of blockchain-based markets will en-
able any aggregator or supplier to establish a call
for flexibility through the implementation of a smart
contract, through which flexible DER owners can in-
teract and transact their flexibility, without the need
of having a previously signed legal contract. Fur-
thermore, the transaction history could be used as a
source of reputation of the different service providers
for one side and on the different flexibility providers
from the other side.
Benefits of Blockchain-based distributed mar-
kets
• A ledger of all transactions performed is pub-
licly available, which favors transparency and ac-
countability.
8Similar to the SolarCoin Proof of solar production.
http://solarcoin.org/
• Requires minimal network infrastructure: Trans-
actions can be sent over any network, includ-
ing insecure ones, as transactions are signed and
contain no confidential information[15].
• It represents a generic infrastructure that can
be seamlessly extended to other services (gas,
water, etc.).
• The billing mechanism is embedded as part of
the system, which reduces operation costs.
• Flexibility to adapt to increasingly dynamic dis-
tribution grid transactions, with plug & play
characteristics.
• Reliability and availability - The ledger of all
transactions performed is available on several
nodes of the infrastructure which improves re-
liability as the infrastructure would seamlessly
support node failures and communication errors.
• Copes with the issue of nodes on the network not
necessarily being trustworthy.
Drawbacks / Challenges
• Proof of Work mechanism requires a lot of en-
ergy; which makes the distributed agreement
mechanism inefficient. Thus, alternatives for
proof of work need to be envisaged, such as Proof
of Stake.
• Another issue is the amount of transactions per
second that the network is capable of processing.
(Bitcoin only supports 7 per second).
• Which is the minimum feasible value to be trans-
ferred on over the blockchain with respect to
fees?
• Other problem is the size of the blockchain, as
it gets bigger as it is used, and less nodes are
capable of managing the bloated blockchain.
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5.2 Household control level
The implementation of a HEMS imposes less strin-
gent requirements in terms of communications and
computation than a neighborhood EMS, due to fewer
devices and smaller size of the problem. Thus, we will
assume the intelligence for household energy man-
agement will be centralized in a dedicated controller.
In a similar way to energy management, there will
be other dedicated controllers for providing services
on different domains such as health, security, enter-
tainment, etc. Those controllers influence the envi-
ronment through control transactions sent to actua-
tors. Such processes pursue different objectives but
may share the same set of actuators or the same en-
vironmental scope through different actuators with-
out further coordination. The lack of orchestration
among controllers can create conflicts that will un-
dermine interoperability and increase complexity of
Smart Home Services.
Issues with conflicting digital transactions are gen-
erally solved by putting trust in a single entity in
charge of centralizing control, keeping a global ledger
of the state of devices and clearing transactions for
avoiding conflicts. An example of such an entity is
Works With Nest9 platform, which maintains a cen-
tralized document with the state of all resources in-
volved. The document is synchronized among part-
ner entities and allows to implement simple ECA-
like rules for controlling the behavior of connected
devices. Simultaneously, Works With Nest enable
households to participate to rebates proposed by util-
ities in exchange for reducing electricity consumption.
The platform orchestrates thermostats to avoid con-
flicts between pre-determined rules and the enforce-
ment of commitments with utilities.
A centralized orchestrator managing every conflict-
ing situation favours siloed ecosystems, each of which
will implement its own architecture undermining in-
teroperability and hindering value creation. Such
an approach lacks plug & play capability, which is
fundamental for an heterogeneous environment over
lossy networking infrastructure. Then, we need a dis-
tributed mechanism that would enable solving con-
flicting access to resources applicable to any domain,
9https://nest.com/works-with-nest/
i.e.: a generic mechanism. A distributed agreement
mechanism based on blockchain technology and self-
enforcing smart contracts is envisaged to natively en-
force security of transactions and to address the or-
chestration issues without relying on a central entity.
Such a distributed agreement mechanism would allow
to decouple controllers from end devices, through an
horizontal open infrastructure where devices from all
product manufacturers can participate.
5.2.1 A chain of ownership to avoid conflicts
We can model the conflicts problem as a double-
actionning of a resource, where the resource is the
control over a device, a set of devices or an envi-
ronmental variable (e.g.: temperature) under certain
context, i.e.: during a certain period of time. In or-
der to solve the conflict, a contract is established to
avoid two entities sharing the control of a certain re-
source at the same time. The contract structures
the acceptable means of exchange of ownership over
resources; conditions for transferring ownership are
previously stated (e.g.: at device deployment time
[16]) and automatically enforced. Once a controller
sends a transaction acquiring the control of a device,
it can be sure of being in power of the resource as
any transaction to control the device by another con-
troller will be considered invalid by all nodes.
5.2.2 On-premises ECA distributed imple-
mentation
In addition to solving conflicts, such a distributed
system based on state of the art cryptographic prim-
itives can provide further benefits: the blockchain-
based platform can enable enforcement of ECA rules
entirely on-premises. Most of the manual and ECA
control would be handled locally and autonomously
by smart contracts running over the “unmanaged”
blockchain. This will improve security and privacy
with respect to cloud-based ECA implementations.
This will also enable connected device vendors to
avoid paying, or to reduce the bill (reduced usage),
for cloud infrastructure along the lifetime of the de-
vice (expected to last several years).
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5.2.3 Challenges of a household blockchain
Given that a cryptocurrency makes no sense in the
interactions among smart home devices, one of the
biggest challenges is to ensure the effectiveness of the
consensus algorithm and the participation of devices
on the network, which can be undermined by lack
of incentives (for device manufacturers to make their
devices blockchain-enabled). In the household we do
not need censorship resistance virtual cash or proof of
work based systems, but we do have a network-based
sybil problem. We are analyzing the use a Proof of
Stake mechanism and to establish a reputation token
instead of a digital currency. We envisage the rep-
utation coin as an utilitarian mechanism to assess
the value that device manufacturers offer to users
by actively participating in securing the blockchain
network, and thus enabling interoperability and dis-
tributed agreement.
Other challenges that would need to be analyzed
by further work are the following:
• The delay imposed by the network and the dif-
ficulty to publish a new block (time between
blocks) are determinant to analyze the feasibility
of using distributed agreement mechanisms for
real-time applications at a household level, i.e.:
the possibility of enabling micro-transactions at
a speed fast enough to provide ECA rule-based
services, involving user interaction.
• Blockchain-based distributed agreement are not
continuously consistent as there will often exist
forks from the main blockchain which will re-
quire some time window for the ”voting” to hap-
pen and to be back in a ”synchronous” state.
The impacts of such forks on the interaction
among devices and controllers needs to be as-
sessed and minimized.
6 Conclusions
Major ongoing evolutions in the electricity industry
potentially represent a key driver for the “energy
transition” and related objectives. Nevertheless, they
impose new challenges in the whole value chain. The
required transformations of the Distribution grid are
today delaying, and in some cases blocking, the pos-
sibility to leverage key opportunities. In this paper
we propose a new paradigm, that we named Virtual-
ized Distribution Grids, which facilitates implement-
ing the required solutions for major distribution grid
challenges without requiring important infrastructure
investments. The proposal includes a new approach
for designing DSOs’ Energy Management Systems.
The hierarchical architecture we present enables the
coordinated participation of any type of player, in-
cluding DSOs, aggregators, and end users (that be-
come prosumers). In addition, in this general frame-
work, we propose specific market-based solutions that
enable deploying advanced technologies (local pro-
duction, storage, BEMs, IoT based demand response
systems and other on-premises technologies), by dif-
ferent players, and coordinating those players in a
way to optimize the overall value while keeping the
distribution network stable and providing the ex-
pected quality of supply. In addition, we present
a distributed architecture, based on the blockchain
principles, that supports the implementation of the
proposed markets. Finally, we extend the architec-
ture to solve key challenges raised in smart homes,
beyond energy management, including policy-based
coordination of controllers from independent service
providers acting on the same connected devices.
We are working in the development and deploy-
ment of the proposed solution over a test bed com-
posed of real residences and on the evaluation of var-
ious market approaches, starting with real-time bal-
ancing markets and DSO reserve mechanisms.
References
[1] E. Wong, L. Burnell, and C. Hannon, “An ac-
tive architecture for managing events in perva-
sive computing environments.”
[2] D. Olivares, A. Mehrizi-Sani, A. Etemadi,
C. Canizares, R. Iravani, M. Kazerani, A. Ha-
jimiragha, O. Gomis-Bellmunt, M. Saeedifard,
R. Palma-Behnke, G. Jimenez-Estevez, and
N. Hatziargyriou, “Trends in microgrid con-
13
trol,” Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 5,
pp. 1905–1919, July 2014.
[3] R. Caldon, A. R. Patria, and R. Turri, “Optimal
control of a distribution system with a virtual
power plant,” Bulk Power System Dynamics and
Control, Cortina. dAmpezzo, Italy, 2004.
[4] H. Saboori, M. Mohammadi, and R. Taghe,
“Virtual power plant (vpp), definition, concept,
components and types,” in Power and Energy
Engineering Conference (APPEEC), 2011 Asia-
Pacific, pp. 1–4, March 2011.
[5] S. Lamparter, S. Becher, and J.-G. Fischer, “An
agent-based market platform for smart grids,” in
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems:
Industry Track, AAMAS ’10, (Richland, SC),
pp. 1689–1696, International Foundation for Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2010.
[6] S. Widergren, C. Marinovici, T. Berliner, and
A. Graves, “Real-time pricing demand response
in operations,” in Power and Energy Society
General Meeting, 2012 IEEE, pp. 1–5, July 2012.
[7] J. Kumar and A. Jayantilal, “Models of dis-
tributed energy resources markets in distribu-
tion grid operations,” in Innovative Smart Grid
Technologies (ISGT Europe), 2011 2nd IEEE
PES International Conference and Exhibition
on, pp. 1–6, Dec 2011.
[8] C. Block, J. Collins, and W. Ketter, “Agent-
based competitive simulation: Exploring future
retail energy markets,” in Proceedings of the 12th
International Conference on Electronic Com-
merce: Roadmap for the Future of Electronic
Business, ICEC ’10, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 68–77, ACM, 2010.
[9] J. K. Kok, C. J. Warmer, and I. G. Kam-
phuis, “Powermatcher: Multiagent control in the
electricity infrastructure,” in Proceedings of the
Fourth International Joint Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AA-
MAS ’05, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 75–82,
ACM, 2005.
[10] S. Parsons, M. Marcinkiewicz, J. Niu, and
S. Phelps, “Everithing you wanted to know
about double auctions, but were afraid to (bid
or) ask,” 2006.
[11] P. Huang, A. Scheller-Wolf, and K. Sycara, “A
strategy-proof multiunit double auction mecha-
nism,” in Proceedings of the First International
Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems: Part 1, AAMAS ’02, (New
York, NY, USA), pp. 166–167, ACM, 2002.
[12] A. Lam, L. Huang, A. Silva, and W. Saad,
“A multi-layer market for vehicle-to-grid en-
ergy trading in the smart grid,” in Computer
Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WK-
SHPS), 2012 IEEE Conference on, pp. 85–90,
March 2012.
[13] W. Cox and T. Considine, “Energy, micromar-
kets, and microgrids,” in Grid-Interop 2011,
2011.
[14] E. Industries, “Explainers.”
https://docs.erisindustries.com/explainers/,
2015. Retrieved November 2, 2015].
[15] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer elec-
tronic cash system,” 2008.
[16] M. Yagita, F. Ishikawa, and S. Honiden, “An
application conflict detection and resolution sys-
tem for smart homes,” in Software Engineering
for Smart Cyber-Physical Systems (SEsCPS),
2015 IEEE/ACM 1st International Workshop
on, pp. 33–39, May 2015.
14
